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OPTIMAL SPECIFICITY IN THE LAW OF SEPARATION OF
POWERS: THE NUMEROUS CLAUSES PRINCIPLE1
Gary Lawson∗
In Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation,2 Professor
John Manning levels a broad, and largely justified, criticism against
both formalist and functionalist approaches to separation of powers
cases, at least as those approaches are frequently employed by jurists.3
Manning points out that each methodology’s adherents often commit a
“generality-shifting” error that can either overstate or understate the
specificity with which the Constitution addresses various separation of
powers problems. Manning urges everyone to reason from the constitutional text rather than from free-floating principles or purposes, in
much the same manner as, and for essentially the same reasons that,
modern methods of statutory interpretation center primarily on textual
analysis. The constitutional text contains numerous clauses regarding
the structure and operations of the federal government, which resolve
structural issues with widely varying degrees of specificity, and to try
to impose theoretical preconceptions about separation of powers onto
those resolutions risks undoing the Constitution itself. One can believe
(perhaps even correctly) that the Constitution’s prescribed degree of
specificity in any given instance might be suboptimal from some external perspective, but that normative stance is not an interpretative
ground for ignoring the Constitution’s numerous separation of powers
clauses. Accordingly, I will call Manning’s text-based approach to the
separation of powers “the numerous clauses principle.”
So framed, I think that Manning is absolutely right. It makes no
interpretative sense to read some principle of “optimal specificity” into
the Constitution to displace the varied principles of specificity reflected
in the many clauses and combinations of clauses that comprise the actual document. Manning is correct that practitioners of both functionalism and formalism are susceptible to this “optimal specificity” fallacy,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
1
∗

With apologies to Tom Merrill, Henry Smith, and a lot of old Roman property lawyers.
Professor of Law and Michaels Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University School of Law.
2 John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939
(2011).
3 Manning is primarily discussing formalism and functionalism as they appear in judicial
opinions. See id. at 1949. Academic separation-of-powers theories may or may not be equally
subject to Manning’s criticisms. In all likelihood, the more closely that an academic theory tries
to track real-world case law, the more prone it will be to committing generality-shifting errors, if
only through inadvertent incorporation. So those of us who blithely ignore the real world are
probably safe.
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and his simply outstanding article should serve as a warning to the entire separation of powers community.
Nonetheless, keeping entirely within the realm of ordinary interpretation, one can find a formalist baby in there with the generalityshifting bathwater. There is no overarching constitutional principle of
“optimal specificity,” but that does not mean that there cannot be other
overarching principles that are fairly derivable from the text and are
therefore consistent with the “numerous clauses principle.” Manning
does not directly dispute this claim; indeed, he affirmatively invites
formalists to spell out the textual and historical principles that they believe ground any propositions about the separation of powers that are
not traceable to specific constitutional provisions. At a number of
points in his discussion, however, he intimates a strong skepticism
about finding any such propositions of consequence.4 In Part I of this
commentary, I explain why I think that the Constitution is a bit more
informative about the range of permissible governmental structures
than Manning appears to believe. In Part II, I address a potential
problem that Manning might have with his primary target audience,
which is real-world lawyers and judges rather than academics. When
judges apply functionalist or formalist reasoning to decide cases, they
may be engaging in a qualitatively different activity than Manning assumes, and his careful interpretative analysis may therefore be largely
beside the point.
I. HIDDEN ABSTRACTIONS
Suppose that in any case currently pending on the Supreme Court’s
docket, before a decision is rendered Congress passes and the President
signs a statute that proclaims: “In docket number xx-xxxx, the Supreme Court shall declare the plaintiff [or defendant] to be the winner.” The Supreme Court possesses the “judicial Power”5 to decide the
case, but Congress (subject to the presentment requirement6) has power “to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution” its own powers plus “all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”7 The statute instructing the Court how
to decide the case is, so argues Congress, enacted “for carrying into
Execution” the judicial power. There is no specific clause in the Constitution that explicitly addresses the relationship between Congress
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
4
5
6
7

See, e.g., id. at 1947–48.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
See id. art. I, § 7, cls. 2–3.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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and the Supreme Court with respect to the manner in which cases are
decided. Is the law constitutional?
The answer (“no!”) seems, and is, obvious. But articulating why
the obvious answer is correct is not so simple — unless one is willing
to give some serious content to the Necessary and Proper Clause and
the Vesting Clauses, which is precisely the path that Manning seems
reluctant to pursue. One could find such a statute unconstitutional because it is not “necessary . . . for carrying into Execution” the judicial
power, because it is not “proper for carrying into Execution” the judicial power, or because it is not really “for carrying into Execution” the
judicial power at all. To invoke any of these reasons, however, entails
giving a measure of bite to the Necessary and Proper Clause (and, either derivatively or principally, the Article III Vesting Clause) that
goes beyond the more specific “numerous clauses” in the Constitution
addressing governmental structure. One must read into the Constitution some hidden abstractions that impose at least some substantive
limitations on the ability of Congress to structure governmental
institutions.
One could, of course, deny that the Necessary and Proper Clause
has any such bite and affirm that Congress can indeed tell courts how
to decide specific cases — and presumably tell the President as well
how to conduct specific investigations and prosecutions. But while it
is more than a bit unseemly for me, of all people, to try to dissuade
anyone from adopting implausible-sounding positions, any such position sounds implausible. It is theoretically possible to read the “judicial Power” as the power to decide cases in accordance with such traditionally accepted methods as the courts see fit to adopt provided that
Congress does not directly prescribe an outcome in the particular case
(and similarly to read the “executive Power” as a presumptive power
to control investigations and prosecutions unless specifically directed
otherwise by Congress), in which case my hypothetical statute would
pose no problem, as Congress would simply be implementing that particular conception of the “judicial Power.” It is very difficult, however,
to read the Constitution as a whole, to consider how that document
would have been understood by a reasonable observer at the time of
ratification, and then to conclude that it allows Congress to control the
decisionmaking processes of the other departments.
It is difficult even when one considers that the drafters and ratifiers
could have inserted, but did not insert, a specific provision forbidding
direct congressional interference with the decisionmaking of other departments, and could have inserted, but did not insert, a generalized
“separation of powers clause” analogous to those included in some other founding-era American constitutions. Certainly, as Manning repeatedly emphasizes, the specificity of many of the provisions in the Constitution counsels against readily reading nonspecified restrictions into
the document. By the same token, however, the textual requirement
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that congressional laws implementing federal powers be objectively
(and not just in the judgment of Congress) “necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution” those powers counsels against giving Congress a blank check to control the decisions of other actors.8 Nor is
there much point in specifying indirect mechanisms for protecting decisional independence, such as guarantees against diminishment in salary9 and limitations on congressional removal,10 if there is no underlying decisional independence to protect. And if the Necessary and
Proper Clause is a reflection of fiduciary or agency norms, so that
Congress must legislate for the other departments as a fiduciary must
act for its principal,11 that consideration also suggests strongly that
Congress should facilitate rather than dictate the exercise of functions
by the other departments. Thus, using nothing more dramatic than
ordinary principles of interpretation, the most likely conclusion is that
a reasonable observer in 1788 would have found that Congress does
not have the power to tell the courts and the President how to do their
respective constitutional jobs (and vice versa).
I have elsewhere, following the lead of Professor Martin Redish,12
called this notion the principle of “decisional independence.”13 There
is no express “decisional independence clause” in the Constitution similar to the Appointments Clause or the Presentment Clause. But the
absence of such an express clause does not mean that there is no “decisional independence clause” — it just means that it is not necessarily
similar to those other clauses, in the sense that it is implicit rather than
explicit. The obvious textual home for such a hidden abstraction is
either the requirement in the Necessary and Proper Clause that laws
for executing federal power be “necessary and proper” for that purpose
or the definitions of “executive Power” and “judicial Power” in the Article II and Article III Vesting Clauses (or perhaps all of the above).
For my purposes, it does not really matter where one locates the principle of decisional independence as long as it is located somewhere.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
8 One could easily construct horrific hypotheticals in which Congress tells the courts how to
decide cases involving Congress’s own powers.
9 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7; id. art. III, § 1.
10 See id. art. II, § 4; id. art. III, § 1.
11 There is very strong evidence, from several different and discrete directions, that the Necessary and Proper Clause embodies precisely such a set of fiduciary norms. See generally GARY
LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS
OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE (2010) (identifying the fiduciary origins of the
Necessary and Proper Clause in background principles of agency law, administrative law, and
corporate law).
12 Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 699 (1995).
13 Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial DecisionMaking, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 205 (2001).
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Of course, to acknowledge the existence of such a principle is not to
acknowledge any particular conception of the principle’s scope. There
is a lot of distance between saying that Congress cannot tell the federal
courts how to decide specific cases and saying that Congress cannot
give an executive officer some measure of tenure or that Congress cannot tell courts what kinds of evidence they can consider when making
findings of fact. Even if I am right that the Constitution does contain
an abstract “separation of powers clause” of sorts, that says nothing
about how broadly or deeply that hidden abstraction limits Congress’s
power to structure the government. All true. Manning is right to
challenge overbroad claims that cannot be traced, through ordinary interpretation, to the constitutional text. My narrow point is only that
ordinary interpretation does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
the only limitations on Congress’s power to structure the federal government are the Constitution’s specific “numerous clauses.” And notice that in order to validate the principle of decisional independence,
one does not need to invoke any grand underlying conception of the
separation of powers that necessarily commanded a consensus during
the founding era. Manning has aptly demonstrated (as have others before him) that it is very unlikely that any such consensus existed.14
The principle of decisional independence, at least in its most obvious
applications, appears to be a principle upon which all plausible theories of separated powers that could conceivably have driven the federal Constitution would converge.15
Nothing that I have said thus far is inconsistent with the main
thrust of Manning’s article. Indeed, Manning does not even insist that
formalists are necessarily wrong when they contend, as do virtually all
of them, that the President has an unlimited constitutional power to
remove executive officials.16 He contends only that they often assume
their case too quickly without mustering the necessary proof that
such a proposition is derivable from the text through ordinary
interpretation.
Nonetheless, lying fairly shallowly beneath the methodological surface are some substantive assumptions about the appropriate role of
hidden abstractions in resolving separation of powers problems. Manning appears to be generally dubious about the use of such abstractions for at least two reasons, one of which I think is wrong and one of
which I think is right but which points to a very different, and very
serious, practical problem with Manning’s project.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
14
15

Manning, supra note 2, at 1993–2005.
Whether the principle, once validated, is limited in scope only to its most obvious applications or whether it can then be extended to applications that would not necessarily fall within an
overlapping consensus is a key question of interpretative theory that I do not pursue here.
16 I am officially agnostic on that question.
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First, Manning invokes what amounts to a burden-of-proof rule
against those who would use the bare Vesting Clauses or Necessary
and Proper Clause as checks on Congress’s power to structure the
government: “If a piece of implemental legislation does not contradict
a particular understanding of the ‘executive’ or ‘judicial’ powers, then
constitutional interpreters have no basis for displacing the Congress’s
default authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to compose
the government.”17 On two separate occasions, Manning remarks that
one “cannot beat something with nothing,”18 meaning that the burden
is on the opponent of congressional legislation to show that such legislation violates some textually derivable separation of powers limitation.19 I beg to differ.
It is a basic principle of epistemology that he who asserts the existence of something bears the burden of proof.20 In the context of a
government of limited and enumerated powers, that means that the
burden of proof is always, at least initially, on the proponent of federal
governmental power to show that the acting institution of the national
government has the enumerated authority to perform the act in question.21 It is therefore incumbent upon Congress, whenever it acts to
structure the federal government, to show that each and every portion
of each and every statute is affirmatively “necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution” some federal power. If there is indeterminacy
about the appropriate scope of that clause, any such indeterminacy
cuts against rather than for claims of legislative power. How deeply it
cuts depends upon the standard of proof to which proponents of federal power should be held. There are many possible standards of proof
that one could adopt: do exercises of authority under the Necessary
and Proper Clause have to be validated beyond a reasonable doubt, is
it sufficient that they be non-laughable, or is the appropriate degree of
proof somewhere in between? Neither Manning nor I have any great

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
17
18
19

Manning, supra note 2, at 2005.
Id. at 1986 n.244, 2005.
Cf. id. at 2024 (noting that a court inclined to invalidate a practice on separation of powers
grounds should ask “whether a specific historical understanding of the theory and practice of legislative power would preclude that form [of legislative action]”).
20 There is good warrant for this principle. The existence of any entity has consequences, and
one can look for those consequences as evidence of the entity’s existence. Nonexistence, however,
does not always have consequences, so the absence of evidence is prima facie proof of nonexistence. There is obviously much more that needs to be said about any such general principle, but
that would require a separate article — and probably an article written by a philosopher rather
than by me.
21 For a more extended discussion of this proposition, see Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy:
Its Cause and Cure, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 411, 424–28 (1996).
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desire to engage that problem here.22 For my purposes, it is enough
simply to point out that proponents rather than opponents of federal
power bear the burden of indeterminacy in the scope of enumerated
federal power, however heavily that burden weighs. The constitutional rule for legislative regulation of other departments is: when in
doubt, don’t. Accordingly, a background norm of separation, which
Manning rightly identifies as part of the formalist superstructure, can
be derived from the Constitution’s baseline burden-of-proof rules even
in the absence of some overarching theoretical conception that can
fairly be said, as an interpretative matter, to inform the document.
Manning’s concerns about burdens of proof suggest a second, related concern about reading content into the Constitution’s vague
structural clauses that Manning does not expressly advance but which
someone sympathetic to his approach could easily put forth: doesn’t
the formalist project imply a relatively freewheeling judicial power to
second-guess the political departments on matters of structure? Manning repeatedly points out that advocates of an abstract separation of
powers principle typically are reluctant to spell out details.23 Before
courts declare statutes unconstitutional and refuse to treat them as law,
wouldn’t it be a good idea for them to have something a bit more substantial to go on than a hidden abstraction about separation of powers
buried in the Vesting Clauses or Necessary and Proper Clause plus a
generalized burden-of-proof norm?
For those of us who focus solely on interpretation and are not particularly concerned with how or whether our interpretative conclusions
translate into real-world adjudication, those kinds of questions are non
sequiturs. What matters is constitutional meaning, not how judges
should behave. But I strongly doubt whether I am Manning’s target
audience. His article is addressed primarily to judges, and to academics who seek to influence judges in the real world, and in that context
concerns about judicial role are quite pertinent and even dominant.
And that is the second potential weak spot in Manning’s armor: Manning is setting forth an agenda for the use of constitutional interpretation in the service of constitutional adjudication, and it is doubtful at
best whether constitutional adjudication, at least in the separation of
powers world, always or even frequently has much to do with interpretation. His arguments are most effective against the people who
are least likely to pay them heed. Or so I will now suggest.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
22 I have preliminarily engaged it elsewhere. See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U.
L. REV. 859 (1992). Hopefully, someone a lot smarter than I am will eventually give the topic the
book-length treatment that it deserves.
23 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 2, at 2023 n.414.
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II. ADJUDICATION WITHOUT INTERPRETATION
Manning’s project assumes that constitutional interpretation is directly relevant to constitutional adjudication — that the Constitution’s
meaning normatively should, and descriptively does, have strong influence on how cases are decided. His argument’s effectiveness (though
not necessarily its intellectual merit) depends on the proposition that
insights about constitutional meaning, drawn from whatever perspective is thought to yield insights about constitutional meaning, are important for adjudicative theory.
So framed, the assumption seems trivial. People can and do disagree about interpretative theory — about both its fine points and its
grosser points — but surely almost everyone agrees that adjudication
ought to be based on whatever theory of interpretation they happen to
adopt. And surely almost everyone agrees that when the Supreme
Court decides separation of powers cases, it is engaging in some form
of constitutional interpretation. One may utterly loathe the particular
theory of interpretation applied in any particular case by any particular group of Justices, but it seems odd to question whether interpretation is actually happening.
I am not at all sure, however, to what extent interpretation and adjudication go together in real-world separation of powers litigation.
There is at least some reason to think that both formalists and functionalists, when they are deciding cases, are not actually engaged in
what either Manning or I would call interpretation. To be clear: I am
not suggesting here that judges deciding separation of powers cases
generally or often interpret poorly (though I am happy to suggest that
elsewhere). I am suggesting that judges deciding separation of powers
cases generally or often do not interpret at all. Interpretation simply is
not an apt description of the activity or enterprise in which the Court
frequently engages. Accordingly, arguments couched in terms of interpretative theory are unlikely to have a lot of traction in the real world.
If I doubt whether courts are interpreting when they decide cases,
what exactly do I think that they are doing? The answer is: They are
adjudicating. They are deciding cases. One way to decide constitutional cases, of course, is to interpret the Constitution and then use
that interpretation to guide (or perhaps even dictate) the process of adjudication. But that is hardly the only way to adjudicate. One could
perfectly well adjudicate without interpreting by, for example, deciding
cases based on the identity of the parties, a coin flip, naked policy preferences, or a host of other decisionmaking methodologies that do not
involve, in any significant way, interpreting the Constitution. If one is
deciding cases by flipping coins, for instance, it will not be of any great
consequence whether any particular method of interpreting the Constitution does or does not commit a generality-shifting fallacy. That fallacy might be important to scholars, and it might be important to (ac-

50

HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 124:42

tual or hypothetical) judges who wish to adjudicate by interpreting,
but it would not be important to judges who wish to adjudicate without interpreting.
Quite obviously, the Supreme Court does not decide separation of
powers cases by flipping coins. Nor do I think that one can accurately
describe the Court’s work product by reference to the identity of the
parties or naked policy preferences. But I am willing tentatively to
suggest — not confidently to assert, but tentatively to suggest — that
the best account of at least a good portion of separation of powers law
results from adjudicative principles that are not interpretative. That
does not mean that interpretation is irrelevant to the adjudicative
process, but it does mean that interpretation may well be the handmaiden of adjudication rather than vice versa. To the extent that the
Court’s work product claims to involve interpretation, perhaps the interpretation is being driven by adjudication rather than the other way
around.
As Manning observes, formalism and functionalism are both difficult to define with any precision.24 There are a great many people
who claim to be (or are claimed by others to be) adherents of these methodologies, and those people disagree among themselves along so
many dimensions that, at best, the terms can serve only as broad umbrellas or family resemblances. Nonetheless, if one limits oneself to
real-world decisionmaking, which is Manning’s principal focus, one
can fairly make some generalizations that capture at least much of
what drives formalist and functionalist adjudication.
Functionalism is actually relatively easy to diagnose. Functionalist
adjudication exists in order to validate the essential institutions of the
modern administrative state. One should be clear about the causeeffect relationship that I am asserting. I am not claiming that functionalism, as an interpretative theory, has the effect of validating the
administrative state (though that is trivially true). Rather, I am claiming that the validation of the administrative state is the conclusion, or
rather the starting point, from which functionalism is derived. The
contours of the administrative state are not shaped by functionalism;
functionalism is shaped by the contours of the administrative state.
To be sure, few functionalists would put the point this bluntly. But
I will stick my neck out and say that almost all functionalists will put
the point more gently if pressed. It is commonplace for functionalists
to say (quite correctly, as it happens) that formalism simply cannot describe the real world that we observe.25 The obvious implication is
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
24
25

See Manning, supra note 2, at 1949.
See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions — A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492 (1987).
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that describing the real world that we observe is as or more important
than interpreting the text. In the context of adjudication, the functionalist desideratum is to preserve the essential structure of modern
administration. The legitimacy of near-plenary federal legislative
power, broad delegations of that power under vacuous standards, and
the combination of legislative, executive, and judicial functions in single agencies simply are not on the table for functionalists. Those institutions and mechanisms are the starting points for constitutional reasoning, not the end products of some interpretative endeavor.
Functionalist theories of interpretation are crafted to yield these conclusions; the conclusions are not crafted from the theories. Perhaps the
most obvious example from the case law is Justice Blackmun’s frank
acknowledgement that the Court’s nondelegation jurisprudence “has
been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems,
Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power
under broad general directives.”26
I have elsewhere explored this idea of functionalism at greater
length — and have suggested that the idea of constructing a theory to
yield conclusions has quite an impressive intellectual pedigree across a
wide range of disciplines.27 It does not entail that interpretation plays
no role in adjudication, nor does it entail that functionalists can never
find institutions of modern administrative governance unconstitutional. It maintains only that over a reasonably broad range of especially
important questions, interpretation follows adjudication rather than
vice versa. In cases in which the basic institutions of modern governance, as opposed to collateral institutions such as the legislative veto,28 are at issue, functionalist adjudication is driven by concerns about
adjudication, not concerns about interpretation. Arguments grounded
in interpretative theory are not relevant in that setting.
Even if my account of functionalism is correct, Manning’s project
has considerable significance for, and bite against, functionalists.
Many separation of powers cases do not involve institutions basic to
the administrative state, in the sense that if those institutions were declared unconstitutional, the essential structure of modern administration would not be torn asunder. In those cases, interpretation may
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
26
27

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
Gary Lawson, Prolegomenon to Any Future Administrative Law Course: Separation of
Powers and the Transcendental Deduction, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 885, 887–91 (2005).
28 The legislative veto is “collateral” in the sense that basic institutions of modern administrative do not depend on it — as evidenced by the fact that the administrative state has done just
fine without it. By contrast, if one were to hold that there could be no delegations of legislative
power, or that the same body could not exercise legislative, executive, and judicial power simultaneously, modern administration could not survive.
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very well play a crucial adjudicative role, so that arguments about
proper interpretation are highly relevant. I mean only to say that the
effective domain of Manning’s project might be limited to a subset of
the separation of powers disputes that arise. Within that domain, its
power is considerable. Outside of that domain, its power is suspect.
What about formalists? What devious hidden adjudicative agenda
do I accuse them of harboring?
As with functionalists, there is nothing either devious or hidden
about the formalist adjudicative agenda. Formalism, as with much of
originalism more generally, is often focused on, and perhaps motivated
by, concerns about judicial discretion.29 Formalism as a theory of adjudication may very well be, at least over a certain range, a mechanism for instantiating a theory of the judicial role.
The acid test for this hypothesis would be the nondelegation doctrine. When he was a law professor, Justice Scalia was a proponent of
reinvigorating the nondelegation doctrine.30 Since becoming a Justice,
he has morphed into one of the Court’s strongest opponents of applying the nondelegation doctrine,31 at least in that doctrine’s traditional
guise of purporting to limit the kind and quality of discretion that
Congress can permissibly vest in executive and judicial actors.32 The
reasons for his turnaround are quite apparent: “But while the doctrine
of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a fundamental element of our constitutional system, it is not an element readily enforceable by courts.”33 In other words, Justice Scalia decides nondelegation
cases in favor of the government primarily because of a theory of the
judicial role, not primarily because of an interpretation of the Constitution. If Justice Scalia were a member of Congress, would he think it
improper to vote against a vacuous bill on the ground that courts
would have a hard time formulating manageable standards for overturning enacted legislation? I would surmise not; I can easily see Senator Scalia voting against the Clean Air Act on delegation grounds. If
that surmise is correct, then adjudication is being driven by something
other than interpretation.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
29 See Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 714 (2011)
(“Originalism was born of a desire to constrain judges” (citation omitted)).
30 See Antonin Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, REG., July-Aug. 1980, at 25.
31 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
32 In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), Justice Scalia dissented from the Court’s
judgment that the United States Sentencing Commission could promulgate binding sentencing
guidelines solely because the Commission had been given rulemaking authority divorced from any
law-execution functions. See id. at 420–21 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As long as the agency’s rulemaking or other interpretative activity is formally tied to some nominally executive task, however,
Justice Scalia will not require Congress to cabin the agency’s discretion with any particular degree
of specificity. See id. at 415–16.
33 Id. at 415.
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To be sure, interpretation and adjudication might converge if the
theory of adjudication was itself derived from interpretation. If, for
example, the Constitution contained a “judicial restraint” clause (or a
“judicial activism” clause), one could derive an adjudicative theory of
the judicial role directly from interpretation. The Constitution, however, contains no such clauses. And to read one into the Constitution
would be precisely the kind of move against which Manning has persuasively warned.
As with functionalists, it is surely not true that formalists decide
every case based on noninterpretative considerations. To whatever extent interpretation drives formalist adjudication, Manning’s comments
have serious implications for formalists. But to the extent that formalist adjudication drives interpretation, it is not clear that Manning’s
project advances the ball. His calls for care and modesty in using hidden abstractions to invalidate laws are consistent with, and indeed
strongly reinforce, a formalism that is driven by adjudicative concerns
about an unduly active judicial role. But in that case Manning’s
project is unnecessary, because formalists will already be doing, for
their own reasons, what Manning prescribes.
Manning takes specific issue with the eagerness with which some
formalists find unconstitutional any congressional limits on presidential removal power. Could not his words of caution serve to reign in
formalist judges who are inclined to that particular generality-shifting
move? Perhaps, but why do they make that generality-shifting move
in the first place? If it is because of an interpretative conclusion, then
they must indeed reckon with Manning’s challenge and explain more
carefully the textual and historical basis for that conclusion. But perhaps a reason for advocating an absolute ban on removal limitations is
not interpretative but adjudicative. Such a flat ban is easy to administer and thus minimizes judicial discretion. Judicial restraint, after all,
can be measured in any number of ways, including but not at all limited to the number of times in which courts invalidate legislative action. A perfectly sensible metric for judicial restraint is how effectively
judges bind their own discretion. A regime that strikes down a great
many laws predictably and mechanically is, by some completely sensible metrics, more restrained than a regime in which laws are invalidated only occasionally but by a looser, less rule-bound process. Unless one takes the view that no limitations on removal are ever
problematic, one must formulate some standard for determining which
limitations are impermissible. If a formalist judge believes that any
such standard is going to raise (perhaps less dramatically) the same
kinds of concerns about manageability that worry Justice Scalia in the
nondelegation context, then there are formalist reasons to adopt a
hard-line no-limitation position, even if one believes in one’s heart of
hearts that the interpretative case for such a position is weak.
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The extent to which functionalists or formalists are actually driven
by noninterpretative adjudicative considerations is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to determine.34 It may well be that the range of cases
in which interpretation plays no or only a modest role in decisionmaking is very small, in which case the significance of Manning’s article
will be commensurate with its intellectual heft. I generally try to
avoid normative claims, but I will go out on a limb here and say, “I
hope so.”

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
34 It gets even more difficult when one introduces precedent into the mix. Is precedent an interpretative or adjudicative consideration? It could in theory be either one, depending upon one’s
reasons for relying upon precedent. If one sees precedent as part and parcel of the “judicial Power,” then reliance upon precedent is interpretative. If one instead sees it as a device for economizing on information or for constraining judicial discretion, it is an adjudicative tool not (necessarily) grounded in interpretation. A few hardy souls, of course, say it is none of the above. See, e.g.,
Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L.
REV. 1 (2007).

